Trying To Put One Label on Two Ideas: Functionalism's Failure as a Monist Theory
Trying To Put One Label on Two Ideas: Functionalism's Failure as a Monist Theory Functionalism is defined as an inherently monist theory of the mind. Functionalism rejects classic dualism due to the interaction problem (Pojman 1998). Functionalists believe that we will be able to understand the brain on the nature of the theoretical interface between neuroscience and psychology (Churchland). Pojman says that functionalism is the "heir to behaviourism". Pojman also states that behaviourists either deny that mental events exist, or they deny their importance. However, functionalists state that there is a brain state and a mental state, which act in a causal relationship. They argue that the input-output relationship exists in a broader sense than an environmental input and behavioural output relationship (Pojman 1998). Functionalists hope to characterize psychological states in terms of their causal connections to behaviour, to stimuli, and to other mental states (Sober 1990). I shall argue that Functionalism is a dualist theory. Functionalism is a dualist theory because it advocates a
mental state and a brain state, which have a causal relationship interacting through computations. So unless the functionalists deny the existence of qualia, they must show that a physical change occurred in ones mind to explain the qualitative differences. Functionalists fall out of this category because they accept the existence and importance of mental events and suggest a causal relationship through computational interaction. Hilary Putnam says that qualia are: "experiences conceived as affectations of our subjectivity"(Putnam 1999). However, if the brain functioned through algorithms and computations in a purely physical sense, then qualia would not occur. The idea of a sole physical entity is a monist idea. If functionalism were to be classified as a monist theory, then all processes would produce the same result since there would only be one physical and easily identifiable state. Functionalism is an attempt to explain the interaction of brain states and mental states through the function of the output. Singular, physically identical entities can only produce singular, identical results. Functionalism is not a replacement for monist theories. The functionalist tries to adhere to a doctrine of a physical brain state supported by mental events. (Sober 1990) Functionalism poses the idea that thinking can be simulated through algorithms and that we are chauvinists to assume only a brain could think. This shows a dualist, causal relationship as a computational function would always produce the same result. The functionalists claim that these two states interact through algorithmic computations. Functionalism fails because it cannot explain the qualia realism of the inverted spectrum argument.
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