Concepts: The Developmental State
Johnson presents some positive aspects of the developmental state model of (soft or hard) authoritarianism that are morally troubling because they are appealing in so many ways. It is hard to oppose growth that has solved so many problems that plague developing nations: growth with redistribution is more or less achieved; in Japan, the standard of living has considerably improved; success has brought legitimacy to controlling bureaucracies; and most importantly in view of the current destabilizing influence of financial markets, there are important political benefits to be gained from the ability to maintain long-term goals by not relying heavily on shareholders and stockmarket analysts for success. In the developmental states, the profit-motive does not undermine long-term goals for the public good as it so often does in the West. Of course there are concerns around the definition of the "public good" and more importantly who gets to define it, but in the developmental system the power granted to the government presents at least scope for the establishment genuinely equitable goals. While the West is left increasingly to the mercy of private interests of short-term
Hein mentions that the touted redistribution in Japan is largely based on postwar land reform and the 1960 Income Doubling Plan, which are isolated events. Johnson is also convincing on the issue of the existence of a universal model: while he claims this one transcends the inherent flaws of both the socialist and the purely capitalist systems, is he merely proposing another system doomed to failure because of its universal claims? The successes of South Korea and Taiwan testify to its widespread applicability, but would it be appropriate everywhere? In terms of the accuracy of the depiction of the model itself, can Johnson's emphasis on the dynamic relationship between the managing bureaucracy and private players be reconciled with the stress Morris-Suzuki's places on the role of social networks of production in private industry? Are they incorporated into the dynamics of which Johnson speaks?The obscuring of ideological pretences is alarming, as Hein demonstrates. And a long-term lens does not only refer to issues of continued growth, it is also absolutely necessary to begin to deal with issues of sustainability. He reveals the institutional barriers to bureaucratic corruption from private interests, but fails to offer any such faith that the system is immune to forces of economic polarization. Can the impact on Japan be explained by Hein's argument that widespread Japanese ignorance of their reciprocal relationship with the international economy left them unprepared for such an event? Did the crisis contribute to the change in perception that has led to Japanese attempts to actively exert international influence especially in South-East Asia, for example, under the auspices of the Asian Monetary Fund? This certainly shows a change from the image that Hein claims the Japanese held of themselves as targets or subjects of a global system beyond their reach of influence. With offshore labour and consumer markets becoming increasingly attractive, however, this happy alignment of interests may fade, and there are no systematic guarantees of redistribution in the development model. Faith in the economy to solve all ills is an arbitrary one, and the absence of a forum to challenge it is politically repressive, though the presence of such forums has not proven capable of threatening this prevailing ideology in the proudly democratic nations of the West. It is interesting to reexamine these articles in light of the financial crisis and it's fallout. Instead of List's protectionist policies, Johnson states that "a united people for economic goals" is an important element of the developmental model for the alternative reason that it transfers authority to a governing body which can then manage long-term plans (usually export-oriented). Furthermore, the later case was based on the fact that economic interests coincided with social welfare ones only since a domestic mass consumer society was needed to absorb further growth. In this light, the trade-off of the token political process of the Western model for more effective, long-term economic management does not seem so deplorable. gain, orientation of the economy towards long-term public needs is becoming impossible. If redistribution is enacted, it seems to be ensured by a political incentive rather than an institutional check, and since the economy is depoliticized in Japan, such a political inclination does not seem to be guaranteed. On this point, however, Hein addresses the issue of redistribution more directly than Johnson, who fails to show how it fits into the developmental system in a necessary way.
Common topics in this essay:
Developmental Johnson,
Korea Taiwan,
Instead List's,
Doubling Plan,
Monetary Fund,
South-East Asia,
Reading Response,
long-term goals,
developmental model,
long-term plans,
developmental system,
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