Running alongside the evolution of the English legal system is the increasing pressure of judicial responsibility in statutory interpretation. As variations of legal disputes unfold and multiply in society, judges are confronted with the challenge to decipher intentions of legislation in the light of previous legal precedents. The problem posed here is that albeit the almost symmetrical facts of two cases, their minute differences can sometimes entail differing judgments. This is rendered possible by the judge's interpretation of the relevant statutes and the tools of arguments used in relation to the preferred facts. This can be seen in a case of prostitution, Behrendt v Burridge and it is later complemented by the analogous case of Smith v Hughes .
             In the case of Behrendt v Burridge, the problem of rule-interpretation is "the inevitable 'open-texture' of language" . The case revolves around the issue of whether or not the term "soliciting" is inclusive of a passive conduct that purports soliciting or a mere advertisement of her availability for prostitution. Contrary to Smith v Hughes, the respondent did not make an active approach or endeavored to communicate her services on the street "by gesture, by word or by signal" . She merely sat in front of her window that overlooks the street, with her image drowned in a pool of red light, wearing a low-cut top and a short skirt. This, according to Lord Boreham, is a conduct that does amount to "solicitation", even though her conduct was a passive one that did not involve an overt form of solicitation. This case also gives rise to another problem of rule-interpretation that has been confidently resolved by Lord Parker in the legal precedent of Smith v Hughes. "The scope for choice and creativity in interpretation depends in part on the malleability of the raw material to be interpreted." In Smith v Hughes, the vague sta...