Three Roads to War
There have been many pieces published on the causes of the First World War, and among them there lie many different opinions as to who or what was truly at fault. The purpose of this essay is to compare the views of three historians, Fritz Fischer, Gerhard Ritter and Konrad Jarausch; each took a different approach to the examination of the war guilt question and as a result also derives a different answer to it. Fischer's work is rich with archival evidence, which by his analysis, confirms the guilt of the German state. Ritter's work, more a rebuttal of Fischer's work than a thorough diagnosis of historical documents, does not provide as much textual evidence, but his argument for the guilt of Austria-Hungary is still clearly put forth. Jarausch, whose work does not staunchly condemn or defend any one person or state, was outfitted with a new piece of evidence - a diary that was kept during those crucial months by Bethmann Hollweg's aide, Kurt Riezler. The Riezler diary provided Jarausch with valuable insight into the personality of the German chancellor and it is him and his decisions that Jarausch chose to center his work around. Jarausch makes an evident attempt to remain more objective than the former two, and as such
Fischer, Ritter and Jarausch all paint the same general picture of the European political atmosphere before Ferdinand's assassination. Germany had developed the feeling that she was being left behind and her hopes of remaining a significant power in the future were becoming increasingly dismal. The next day, Bethmann Hollweg met with Szogyeny and once again assured him of Germany's support - this confirmation of the "blank cheque" by the chancellor now gave the promise the seal of authenticity. The Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Berlin, Szogyeny, first spoke with Wilhelm II, where he was assured of Germany's full support even in the case of armed conflict. First, Fischer judges, and rightly so, that Wilhelm's oath was based on the gravely erroneous belief that France and Russia were neither strong enough at the time to impede the actions or present any threat to either Germany or Austria-Hungary. It is his view that Germany's support of a hard line of conduct was contingent on the belief that "the blow [would] fall immediately without long negotiations with other powers, and before the impression of the bloody deed at Sarajevo had evaporated throughout the world. Though before discussing Wilhelm's reaction, Fischer first makes mention of the Austro-Hungarian chief of staff Baron Conrad, who he says had longed for the chance to take on Serbia since 1912 and at news of the assassination had immediately jumped at the opportunity. Jarausch paints a picture similar to that of Ritter: he maintains that Germany's reaction to the assassination was well-considered and that Wilhelm's rebuke was his response to what seemed to be flagging support for the German ally. After learning of Wilhelm's reaction, the Viennese ambassador assured Austria-Hungary that it could proceed with Germany's full support; Hojos was sent, along with with two documents, to Berlin to obtain confirmation. It is Fischer's opinion that Germany's eagerness for conflict is betrayed by Wilhelm II's chastising of Tschirschky and his urge to quickly address the Serbian question indicated by "his famous words 'now or never. He essentially contradicts Fischer in that he does not believe that Germany's actions were meant to be covert and deceptive, but perhaps that they left too much room for interpretation. It is quite clear who Fischer believed were the most at fault for the start of the First World War: his belief was that Germany brought the situation to a head by pursuing a foolish and dangerous foreign policy in order to break up the Entente and secure a future in Europe. Ritter's view of blame is equally as obvious: it was Austria-Hungary's overpowering desire to crush the Serbian threat to their empire that led them to pursue their reckless policies and in turn drag Germany into world conflict as well. Ritter argues that Hojos had been sent to Berlin, not summoned, and therein lay further proof that Austria-Hungary had played the role of aggressor during this crisis while Germany had acted as nobly and sensibly as possible. " She was well aware of the bleak outlook for both her and her ally in the future and as such saw a response a necessary to maintain the significance of both states within Europe.
Common topics in this essay:
Baron Conrad,
Bethmann Hollweg,
Germany Austria-Hungary,
Nevertheless Fischer,
Fischer Ritter's,
Ritter Jarausch,
Europe Jarausch,
Contradictory Fischer,
World War,
Riezler Riezler,
germany's support,
bethmann hollweg,
ritter's argument,
fischer's opinion,
assured germany's support,
bethmann hollweg's,
hollweg's urging,
blank cheque,
german chancellor,
foreign policy,
desire war,
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Acceptance Essays
