Khrushchev and the 1956 hungar
The overlapping crises in Hungary and Poland in the autumn of 1956 posed a severe challenge for the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU). After a tense standoff with Poland, the CPSU Presidium (as the Politburo was then called) decided to refrain from military intervention and to seek a political compromise. The crisis in Hungary was far less easily defused. For a brief moment it appeared that Hungary might be able to break away from the Communist bloc, but the Soviet Army put an end to all such hopes. Soviet troops crushed the Hungarian revolution, and a degree of order returned to the Soviet camp. Newly released documents from Russia and Eastern Europe shed valuable light on the events of 1956, permitting a much clearer and more nuanced understanding of Soviet reactions. This article will begin by discussing the way official versions of the 1956 invasion changed—and formerly secret documents became available—during the late Soviet period and after the Soviet Union disintegrated. It will then highlight some of the most important findings from new archival sources and memoirs. The article relies especially heavily on the so-called Malin notes, which are provided in anno
(Gomulka later claimed that arms were in fact disseminated, but the evidence generally does not bear out these assertions. ” Although Gero believed that the HWP Central Leadership plenum on 18 July might “restore solid unity” at the top levels of the party, he was concerned that “severe complications could emerge unexpectedly” at the plenum. But by the time Gomulka began pressing this demand on 26 October, the deteriorating situation in Hungary gave Khrushchev a strong incentive to prevent renewed difficulties with Poland. Rakosi hoped to dispel any impression of weakness by returning to his earlier policy of “stern measures” against “hostile” and “anti-socialist” forces. Although these events were intended mainly as a display of unified national support for the new Polish leadership in the face of external pressure, some of the speakers, particularly at a rally in Wroclaw on the 23rd, expressed open hostility toward the Soviet Union. Although Hungarian soldiers were supposed to operate alongside Soviet units, troops from the Hungarian state security forces, police, and army proved incapable of offering necessary support, and some defected to the side of the rebels. As the Hungarian crisis escalated, splits within the Soviet leadership came to the surface. The Polish leader demonstrated the credibility of his promises by ordering Polish officers to cease considering the prospect of a complete withdrawal of the Soviet Northern Group of Forces from Poland. Gero’s alarm about the situation is fully understandable. Suslov’s strong backing for Rakosi at this point was in line with the views of the entire CPSU Presidium. ” Other officials, including Zhukov and Georgii Malenkov, defended Mikoyan and Suslov, arguing that “we shouldn’t lay blame for the situation on our comrades” and that it was “unfair to condemn [Mikoyan] right now. Gero’s plight was made immeasurably worse later in the evening when Hungarian state security (AVH) forces, acting without authorization, opened fire on unarmed demonstrators outside the main radio station in Budapest who were seeking to enter the building to broadcast their demands. Although the main purpose of his trip was to hold negotiations with Tito and other senior officials, he extended his stay to take a vacation on the Yugoslav coast. These documents were all published in Hungarian translation in 1993 as a two-volume collection. 75 Khrushchev and all but one of the other participants strongly supported the introduction of Soviet forces, but a key Presidium member, Anastas Mikoyan, opposed the decision, arguing that “the Hungarians themselves will restore order on their own.
Common topics in this essay:
CPSU Presidium,
Soviet Union,
Josef Bem,
East European,
Soviet Presidium,
Petofi Circle,
Hungary Poland,
Laszlo Rajk,
Warsaw Pact,
Soviet Army,
cpsu presidium,
soviet leaders,
soviet troops,
soviet union,
soviet military,
soviet presidium,
central leadership,
hwp central,
hwp central leadership,
malin notes,
petofi circle,
senior hungarian officials,
soviet military officers,
cpsu central committee,
soviet troops hungary,
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Acceptance Essays
