Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics and Human Morality
Aristotle distinguishes the concept of performing a just act from the concept of acting justly. Primarily, that distinction relates to the underlying motivation or purpose of performing the just acts. Just acts, such as those with beneficial consequences to other that are not specifically intended, may very well be consistent or in-line with justice, but without necessarily constituting acting justly. According to Aristotle's Nicomachean ethical principles, acting justly consists of performing just acts whose motivation is specifically to achieve just aims; a necessary element of acting justly is desiring that such Donating money to charitable causes is an example of a just act, regardless of whether or not the donor particularly cares about the welfare of the recipients of his charity. If his main purpose for donating is to impress others or to improve his reputation, or to save on taxes, the act is still just, but it is not considered to be acting justly. Rather, the charitable donation is a just act that merely coincides, or is in-line, Just Motivation, Just Acts, and Justice of Charact
For example, ignorance is considered a mitigating factor in personal responsibility for bad conduct; where the individual acts out of ignorance, his subsequent remorse is considered a basis for defining his prior conduct as involuntary. However, even where he is not remorseful, under Nicomachean ethics, he is considered to have acted "not voluntarily" provided he acted under mistaken belief of facts at the time. Instead, Aristotle focuses on the subordination of different but connected pursuits, distinguishing them mainly by the degree to which one derives its value from association with, or strictly as a function of another. Aristotle characterized voluntary behavior as the only valid candidate for praise and also for criticism, reasoning that only volitional choices are capable of exhibiting either moral virtue or immorality. The analog in contemporary penal law is the ancient concept Ignorantia juris non excusat, translated from Latin into English as "ignorance of the law is no excuse. Outward friendliness is capable of complementing genuinely virtuous character or of completely belying immoral character. Similarly, one who strikes another under the mistaken belief that he is justified in doing so because he erroneously believed he was under attack and acting in self defense is not criminally culpable. Whereas Nicomachean ethics emphasizes the degree of excellence in implementation, objective ethics and logic would suggest that poor implementation of pursuits capable of achieving goals that are worthwhile in and of themselves is more virtuous than excellently executed pursuit of goals that are not particularly worthwhile in and of themselves. In some respects, these distinction parallel modern legal definitions of crimes of varying degrees of criminal culpability. Likewise, it is understandable why wit might be appreciated in others for the enjoyment it brings, but neither friendliness on its own or wittiness on its own is necessarily associated with any other measure of virtuous character, precisely because both are as fully capable of coexisting with admirable character as with poor character. Virtue as a Character Value: Aristotle defines virtue of character in relation to excellence, but seemingly without distinction as to the inherent value of the object of excellence. Voluntary, Involuntary, and Compulsory Action: Aristotle distinguished human action as either the product of voluntary, involuntary, or compulsory action. One similarity between Nicomachean ethics as pertains to the relevance of ignorance and moral conduct is that only ignorance of facts are considered to render involuntary otherwise voluntary conduct that is motivated by ignorance. Courage, just like excellence, is capable of applying equally to pursuits that are inherently virtuous and laudable and to pursuits that are inherently valueless, even entirely immoral or wicked. Specifically, by the same process used to distinguish acts from their motivation, Nicomachean ethics should emphasize the distinction between excellence, pride, and courage in relation to their object or their purpose; in that regard, virtuous purpose should be a prerequisite to valuing pride, excellence, or courage in implementation.
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