a defense for relativism
I do not fully agree with Shaw’s disputation against the diversity argument for meta-ethical relativism, in which he states that mere diversity and disagreement on what is considered morally right, is not enough reason to claim that there is no objective truth, nor a standard by which we can try to arrive at it and so there is no reason to worry about the claims of the relativist. The reason that I say “fully” is because, although I do agree that the diversity argument does not entirely rule out the possibility of objective morality, I simply do not feel that this is the argument’s whole intention in the first place. Rather it is claiming that we as a global nation, past and present, will never grasp this objective truth which does raise the question of whether there can be such a thing, and with this I do agree. I will lay out my reasoning by first explaining what the initial claim that the diversity argument for meta-ethical relativism states. Then I will give a brief account of Shaw’s refutation and lastly I will explain how his argument, although it gives good reason as to why relativism may be flawed, does not provide sufficient evidence for a rational person to abandon the diversity argument for meta-ethical relativism a . . .
In other words; there are so many different people with different opinions, not only across cultures and societies but also time, that it is reasonable to see how moral truth can be considered different for all of these groups. Shaw outlines different theories which intend to weaken the relativist’s argument, including those of; Naturalism, Intuitionism, and Emotivism, which might I add are all themselves flawed in some way, but no real conclusion is reached as to how perfectly they prove to fault relativism. But then I ask why a rational person would spend any time defending or relying on something that they cannot fully understand. 30) based on the fact that relativism cannot completely rule out the possibility of objectivity. Moral Relativism, put quite simply, states that there are no objective truths or morals, but that these are conditional and dependent on a number of factors. It has two main claims; a) “there are no universally valid standards” (Waluchow, p. Shaw even says that they do not do so but that they “take us a fair distance toward justifying a determinate set of moral rules” (G&H, p. Shaw makes a valid inference, that just because we cannot come to realize what this objective truth might be, doesn’t not mean that there is no such thing. 68) and b) “the validity of moral standards is dependent on cultural acceptance (Conventionalism) or personal choice or commitment (Subjectivism)” (Waluchow, p. Shaw is trying to undermine the meta-ethical diversity theory on the basis that just because we cannot see it does not mean that it’s not there. Take for example the fact that when we discuss diversity in ethics we do not only look at diversity at this present time, but also look back to the past, even in class we discussed cases such as the Nazi’s, surly we cannot sit down and speak to Hitler himself and discuss his moral principles and debate about how we should go about deciphering a new universal moral system. The first states that there is universal morality and the latter suggests that morality is dependant on time, person and place. In conclusion Shaw states that “we need not worry further about the claims of the relativist” (G&H, p. 68), the first of which the diversity argument we are looking at focuses on. He presents the example of having “different factual beliefs” (G&H, p.
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