In the past, the United States has pursued its own vision of international security based upon a particular conception of politics. Its policies have naturally included the use of physical power to underscore strategic aims. This paper seeks to canvass the nuances of US military engagement in the specific context of counterterrorism policy. The politics of physical force traverses the need for both moral and tactical justification. In a broader framework of strategic doctrine, the use of force to achieve strategic goals dictates a comprehensive assessment of the dynamics of military constraints and political realities. Therefore, the fundamental success of an ambitious and unilateral United States counterterrorism doctrine hinges upon its ability to focus upon the tangible and political contingencies of staging a War on Terrorism. In order to go to wage a war there must be an identifiable enemy. Within the constraints of our state-centric international system, there is an equal need to accommodate for the political climate in which one exists. The failure to understand both the enemy and the environment will result in lopsided policies that obstruct the achievement of strategic goals.
             In the wake of 9/11, with the subsequent wars on Afghanistan and Iraq, there in an increasingly heightened sensibility of the need for a consolidated US stance contra terrorism that elucidates a clear and sustainable plan for military engagement to preclude the dangers of 'imperial overreach'. The use of military force by the United States in relation to Afghanistan and Iraq prompted, and continues to prompt, debate and criticism. Suggestions of policy conflation (as to whether or not terror was the true target of these military efforts) raise a serious question of determining what substantively constitutes the terrorist threat. Additionally, the practical considerations underpinning extensive military commitments loom large. Without ventu...