During the late nineteenth century the Russian government undertook a policy of rapid industrialisation which, due to a combination of factors, drove the desire to industrialise Russia for the principle aim of keeping the 'facade' of her militaristic strength and power status.
             It was evident to Alexander III that Russia's defeat in the Crimean War highlighted its backwardness compared to other great European nations such as France and Britain, and revealed a need to modernise and industrialise. It forced the government to recognise the vital relationship between industrial strength and military power. This became further apparent after the use of railways and modern weaponry in the German Unification wars during the late nineteenth century; and diplomatic defeat in the Congress of Berlin in 1878 by other European powers. In addition, Russia had not undergone an industrial revolution which "would transform its military capacity not simply through increased productivity but through the gather pace of technological development spawned by the industrial revolution" – whereas its rivals, namely Germany and Britain, already had.
             In economic terms the government saw a number of ways in which industrialisation was necessary. They found a need to develop their own resources instead of relying on foreign imports, saw how agricultural depression illustrated the need for alternative sources of income, and railways were seen to be a high priority as they were vital to organise resources. Overall the government saw that an economic advance would lead to increased wealth, and thus greater potential government revenue.
             The need for industrialisation was clearly vital for the Russian government; however it did face certain practical difficulties and problems which hindered the acceleration of industrial development. There was an inefficient domestic agricultural system which, coupled with the depression in agri...