Decision Making More than thirty years have passed since the dramatic cling of arm in the remote Himalayan region of the Sino-Indian border. This Time gap seems to be appropriate for a correct reexamination of the conflict. The account of India's attempt to find balance with China, ever since the Kongska Pass incident in 1959 until the attack of 1962, is not merely a fact sheet that we can brows and toss away. In stead we have to link each idea to the event and causes that might have played a role in the conflict. Ever since 1959 the border problem between Asia's biggest two nation states has been picking up speed at a threatening speed. The year 1962 was the unfortunate year for India, which knocked out any possibility of understanding between China and India. Of course, such an act of terror could have not started without some kind of the reason, whatever it may be. The chronological order of pre-crisis decisions taken India's authorities are that the latter helped Nehru convey his thought and policies to the outside world in a forceful and organized manner (Brecher, 1959). But as Rajani Palme Dutt said in his book "The problem of India," foreign policy was exercised "more behind the scenes than in meetings of th
India"tms correct evaluation of its conflict with China enabled her to act accordingly and carry out its plans in such a chronological order that would be best for its national security. Their appropriate actions in the Sino-Chinese border problem were of crucial importance. This role was supposed to reflect the fact that India was a considerably new nation-state. And as a contra action of that he developed India's frontier administration (Maxwell, 1970). Some of them were hard to be taken, others were voted secretly and even some decisions were left undecided. So in the way of image making, Nehru had made it a fundamental view of Indian foreign policy to treat former Soviet Union and China as separate powers, passing two different sets of problems. The Defense Minister also felt a kind of "spiritual kinship" with China (Langyel, 1962). Another reason for the obstruction of Indo-American relations was the U. Nehru himself realized that a hostile frontier with China, for example, would mean an expenditure of all Indian resources just to defend it (Gopal, 1980). Fourth came the belief that Chinas attempt to influence and pressure India was due to Communist ideology. And what lay in the path of the realization of this idea was India. She was a very important player on the world stage, where questions of war and peace were decided. He demonstrated that "in regard to any major problem of a country or a group of countries of Asia, India has to be considered" (Gopal, 1980). overcame their suspicion of nonalignment. Even though Menon and Nehru were on the same side of the battle, they indeed shared some differences.
Some topics in this essay:
Chinas Tibet, China India, Southeast Asian, Union China, India China, Cold War, Chinese Russians, Menon Pant, Soviet Union, China Langyel, hoffmann 1990, langyel 1962, foreign policy, former soviet union, krishna menon, maxwell 1970, china india, cold war, former soviet, soviet union, gopal 1980, soviet union china, hoffmann 1990 india, threat indias security, cold war power,
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