Atomic Bomb
Herbert Feis served as the Special Consultant to three Secretaries of War. This book was his finale to a series on the governmental viewed history of World War II, one of these receiving the Pulitzer Prize. Mr. Feis gives personal accounts in a strictly factual description leaving out no information that the president and high officials discussed within the walls of the White House. The information that is presented is referenced countlessly throughout the book. His position in the government gave him the ability to have direct knowledge from personal individuals, in the government at that time, who had assessed the actions first hand. With these contacts his information is not presented as secondary information. In early August 1945, two atomic bombs were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These two bombs quickly yielded the surrender of Japan and the end of the American involvement in World War II. By 1946, the two bombs caused the death of perhaps as many as 240,000 Japanese citizens. The popular view that dominated the 1950s and 60s, presented by President Truman and Secretary of War Henry Stimson, was that the at the dropping of the atomic bombs was a solely military action that avoided the loss of
"In the end, these final preparations were not effective. " Instead Truman continued to withdraw his American troops from Eastern Europe. Feis wanted us to assume that Truman explored the two major alternatives above, and perhaps the three others as well. After consulting with Joseph Grew and Harry Hopkins, who both believed that Japan was already on the verge of defeat, Admiral Leahy recommenced to Truman on 18 June 1945 that the demand for unconditional surrender be modified. " On 16 May 1945 Stimson told President Truman that, "We shall probably hold more cards in our hands later than now," and supposedly urged him to adopt the policy of delay. Tibbets, dropped the "little boy" uranium atomic bomb on the city of Hiroshima. Together with his advisors, Truman never thought to rethink the basic principals established under the Manhattan Project's inception under Roosevelt, and therefore dropped the bomb because they believed in their heart it was the right thing to do, and never reconsidered. Truman broke away from these good-natured relations and sought to follow a new "hard-line" policy. Nevertheless, the first two of these are arguably the most realistic, and therefore my discussion will be limited to the first two only. "The Japanese forces waged a stubborn, often suicidal battle. Three days later a second bomb, made of plutonium and nicknamed "fat boy," was dropped on the city of Nagasaki. The military pressures stemmed from discussion and meetings Truman had with Secretary of War Stimson, Army Chief of Staff General Marshal, Chief of Staff Admiral William Leahy, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal and others. In the 1960s a second idea developed, put forth by a collaboration of historians, that claimed the dropping of the bomb was a diplomatic maneuver aimed at gaining the upper hand in relations with Russia. To decide if the bomb would have been a savior of lives had the alternative failed, Feis could only guess how many Americans and Japanese would have died in the November invasion.
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Acceptance Essays
