Assyrian Empire
There are two main reasons why the Neo-Assyrian Empire became so powerful between 934 - 610 B.C. First, through this era, the power of Assyria was largely dependant on the success of its army (Saggs, 1962). Winer (1961) states that the Assyrian military perfected the art of war. During this time period, some 180 punitive expeditions or campaigns were launched against foreign foes, rebellious vassals or other anti-Assyrian groups (Olmstead, 1923). Second, the Assyrians developed an efficient and effective administrative system with which to maintain, supply and expand their empire. In Assyria, warfare was a way of life (Saggs, 1962) and its government was run as a military state (Winer, 1961). Early wars had been like raids; undertaken to obtain booty, settle disputes over land and water rights, or fought for military notoriety. During the second Assyrian Empire, war became a part of the state policy. The raid was replaced by a detailed and carefully planned scheme of conquest (Sayce, 1899). The Assyrian Empire maintained a powerful standing army, not only to satisfy its imperialistic appetite, but also to safeguard the King against potential rebellious provincial governors. Sayce (1899) writes that nothing was sp
Olmstead (1923) suggests that the Persians, Romans and the Greeks modeled much of their empires after the Assyrians. Besides direct taxation, there were also indirect taxes (Sayce, 1899). The expectation of the Assyrian King in this matter is evident in Esarhaddon's message to the vassal ruler of Tyre:"You shall not open a letter I send youwithout the Qipu-official. The army also contained a mobile contingent of cavalry that featured mounted archers and lancers. By messengers, governors were expected to send frequent and detailed reports to the capital. Part of the army was composed of mercenaries, while another part was recruited by conscription (Sayce, 1899). Breatsed (1944) states that the Assyrian government further regulated the social and business life of its people with a code of laws. If these reports indicated an impending attack of more significant numbers than these outposts could handle, then a larger more powerful Assyrian force would be sent to address the problem. With respect to their treatment of defeated foes, Olmstead (1923) states that the Assyrians were arguably no worse than any other conquerors. Permanent posts were maintained along these roads that kept horses and mules in readiness to carry dispatches to and from the capital (Saggs, 1962). The Assyrian commissariat carefully calculated everything from daily rations for its troops to the hay and straw needed to feed its horses. Both Persians and Assyrians used posting stages (Saggs, 1962), across their empires so messages could be rapidly passed between the King and his governors. Intelligence reports of any suspected activity were passed back to the capital for evaluation.
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