The Domino Theory
In the wake of the temporary partitioning of Vietnam at the Geneva Conference of 1954, the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration was determined to do what it could to ensure that South Vietnam remained out of the hands of Communists. Eisenhower suggested in a 1954 speech that if the Communists were victorious in Vietnam, the rest of Southeast Asia would "topple like a row of dominoes" to Communist ideology. The Eisenhower administration believed that if Southeast Asia turned Communist it would effect the United States in a great number of ways, including economically and politically. Representative John F. Kennedy, in 1952, said that Asia is an area "where Communists are attempting to seize control...where the tide of events has been moving against us. The Communists have a chance of seizing all of Asia in the next five or six years." The assumption of Eisenhower and his administration that Communism would spread like a bad virus was a false one. Not only was their ample evidence during the actual fighting of the Vietnam War that this was not the case, but from declassified papers and notes it can be shown that the domino theory was notably inaccurate. Some even thought the domino theory might adverse effects on the Unite
Also, Asian governments and their people knew that the problem in South Vietnam was the failure of South Vietnamese leadership, not of American resolve. Such cases included Indonesia, Cambodia and Pakistan; however, China could not turn any of these countries into permanent allies. The Soviet Union believed that each country needed to fight its own battles and use their own methods to help them gain independence. The domino theory can also be shown to be false in that Vietnam would eventually want American help after the war. China and the Soviet Union said it was a new world where relations with the United States was important and they were not in a place to offer aid to the North Vietnamese. He was not a tool of Communism, in fact, Ho was relentless in his pursuit of direct ties to the United States. In turn, they could become a viable economic force in Southeast Asia with their resources of rice, tungsten, rubber, and tin; and all this time there was not a Communist power overlooking their every move or supporting them. Also, who was to say that the type of guerrilla warfare and other tactics utilized by the Viet Cong would work in other parts of the world? Vietnam was a case unlike many others and the idea that other acts of nationalism could be as effective as the Vietnamese was a far-stretched idea. They could not woo underdeveloped countries towards Communism while supporting anti-government oppositions in the same places. The domino theory was a false assumption and taught the United States a great lesson in foreign diplomacy. Tran Quang Co, a former First deputy Foreign Minister in Vietnam, pointed out during McNamara's visit that "the nature of the struggle was not to undermine neighboring countries. All in all, both Communist superpowers were not ready to compromise their position in the world to support Vietnam in their quest for independence or in the Soviet Union's case to even recognize them. Situations are different in every country and each country knows what is best for them. We've got to acquaint people with how dangerous it is for political leaders to behave the way we did. That decision is for the Vietnamese.
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