Philosphy berekly

that the materialist is a skeptic. In the writing of his three

dialogues, Berkeley develops two characters: Hylas (the materialist)

and Philonous (Berkeley himself). Philonous draws upon one central

supposition of the materialist to formulate his argument of skepticism

against him; this idea is that one can never perceive the real essence

of anything. In short, the materialist feels that the information

received through sense experience gives a representative picture of

the outside world (the representative theory of perception), and one

can not penetrate to the true essece of an object. This makes logical

sense, for the only way to perceive this real essence would be to

become the object itself! Although the idea is logical, it does

contain a certain grounding for agnosticism. Let the reader consider

this: if there is no way to actually sense the true material essence

of anything, and all knowledge in empiricism comes from the senses,

then the real material essence can not be perceived and therefore it

can not be posited. This deserves careful consideration, for the

. . .

At this point Berkeley explains that the so-called tertiary

qualities of an external object are non-existent. In accordance with the immaterialists' view, my actively

perceiving mind would be electing not to reflect back upon the past. However, when the museum closes and the person goes

home, does the artwork continue to exist? Obviously the person pursues

other activities of the day, and he ceases to think about what he did

earlier. Unlike the materialists' view, the

immaterialist puts God at the center of his views. Therefore, for any person to perceive something, the

idea must be in the mind of God first. Logically, the only possible

way for this to occur is if the external object had a mind for the

qualities to be thought of and stored by. Secondary qualities are those things

that are concrete (sense oriented), such as color, smell, sound, and

taste. The materialist feels that these primary qualities persist even

when the secondary ones are not there. Therefore, it follows

that, since no primary, abstract quality can exist alone, it is the

same as a secondary quality in which an actual object must first be

perceived. After

being enlightened by the above proposed argument, though, that same

materialist is logically forced to agree that, because the "material

substratum1" itself can not be sensed, its existence can not be

treated as knowledge. With

this being the case, a person can only have a single sensation at a

time. In the three dialogues, Hylas brings up the point

that these qualities are "perceive[d] by the sense.

Common topics in this essay:
Berkeley Philonous, , Joel Feinberg, God God's, human mind, primary qualities, mind god, secondary qualities, infinite mind, god's mind, external object, mind infinite, exist mind, finite mind, primary secondary qualities, representative theory perception, real primary qualities, reader attempt imagine, perceive real essence,

Approximate Word count = 2215
Approximate Pages = 9 (250 words per page double spaced)

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