Atomic Diplomacy
Atomic Diplomacy Revisted: U.S. Nuclear Security Policy, Kennen to Kissenger The emergence of the United States as a dominant party in balance of power equations is a relatively new phenomenon in world history. New military technology coupled with increased global integration has allowed the United States to reinvent the fundemental assumptions of international diplomacy while propelling itself to the top of the hedgemonic stepladder. This positioning was achieved peacemeal during the course of the first two world wars, but it wasn't until the deployment of the atomic bomb that the U.S. assumed its position as a true superpower. The years that followed this unparalled ascension are the most fascinating times in the history of U.S. international relations. Hopefully, an investigation into this atomic diplomacy, along with a balanced analysis of the problems of conceptualizing and implementing containment, will provide insight for our current efforts to devise a workable post-war national security policy. There is no way to tell the sotry of post-war national security without also teling the story of George Kennen. Kennen, the formost expert of Soviet Affairs in early post-war America, is almost wholly responsbile for the policy o
The late mistakes of the Truman administration would be carryed over into the Eisenhower years. Nuclear weapons were part of an integrated system of containment and deterence. Kissenger said in 1968 that "there was now no single decisive index by which the influence of states can be measured" (Kissenger 277). This could be done most effectively by relying on atomic weapons, and on the strategic air and naval power necessary to deliver them" (Dulles 147). In retrospect, the most startling deficiency of the Eisenhower administration's strategy was its bland self-confidence that it could use nuclear weapons without starting an all out nuclear war. This was clearly impossible with the Soviets, making Eisenhower's policy foolhardy and naive. Limited nuclear conflict was possible, as Kissenger argued in Nuclear Weapons and Foriegn Policy, "but only if those participating in it had agreed beforehand on the boundries beyond which it would nto extend" (Kissenger 124). We are often caught in circumstances where our only available riposte is so disproportionate to the immediate provocation that its use risks unwanted escalation or serious political costs to the free community. Once Kennedy was killed, there was an era of make-believe in the Pentagon. This required a capacity to act on all levels, ranging from diplomacy through covert action, guerilla operations, coventional and nuclear war. While limited success was achieved in some international arenas during the Kennedy and Johnson years, Vietnam seals the coffin on the flexible response.
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Acceptance Essays
