If releasement exists as a product of waiting, then man cannot describe it in any way at all unless he escapes re-presentation and finds himself in the that-which-region of openness. At the same time, man never accurately depicts releasement because he lacks the words to do so. As Heidegger says, "There is much which we often cannot say, but only because the name it has does not occur to us." By describing releasement, man re-presents it, thus concealing the truth. Man does not hold power over truth, but in his words, misrepresents it. Theater and philosophy then exist as re-presentations of truth, but not the actually truth itself. They participate in the enactment of truth as some of the most accurate re-presentations that man holds the ability to give without giving someone else the experience in and of itself.
             Heidegger describes releasement as a type of waiting that does not fix itself upon a particular object to wait upon. Instead, man waits, and through waiting associates himself with a kind of openness. Once man finds himself realizing this openness, he transcends the horizon, which appears as only relative to objects and our re-presentations of them. At that moment, man finds himself in the that-which-regions where he surpasses re-presentations. Surpassing re-presentations exists as the key to releasement. Therefore, man reaches releasement after recognizing the openness and coming to terms with releasing himself from constructs.
             Releasement from constructs then clarifies man's thinking, releasing him from words that re-present nothing. Enactment, then, exists as closer to the truth than words because it circumvents the need for words through imitation. Although imitation never works as existing as truth, enactment works as an accurate re-presentation.
             Despite the veracity in this, man cannot even re-present releasement without having experienced it. Without coming to terms with openness,...