A Critique of Mill's Proof of the Principle of Utility
A Critique of Mill’s Proof of the Principle of UtilityIn his work, Utilitarianism, J S Mill asserts that, “happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things being only desirable as means to that end.” He goes on to offer a “proof” of the principle of utility (which may be defined as ‘the greatest good for the greatest number’), through which he hopes to show that the moral worth of an action consists in its conduciveness or otherwise to the general happiness. In this essay, I will attempt to show that Mill’s proof is unsound and that unrestricted utilitarianism is an undesirable moral doctrine at both societal and personal levels. At the commencement of his enquiry into “of what sort of proof the principle of utility is susceptible”, Mill declares that, “to be incapable of proof by reasoning is common to all first principles, to the first premises of our knowledge, as well as to those of our conduct” (Ch.4). Rather than present a rational argument in favour of utilitarianism, then, Mill asks his reader to reflect upon their inner motives for action and suggests that these are based upon a desire for one’s own happiness. “This, however, being a fact, we have . . .
Mill might counter that the long-! term social unhappiness caused by such injustice would outweigh the short-term happiness produced by any particular conviction, yet were the reality behind such convictions kept secret and were the proceedings of past trials destroyed his objection would not stand. This fallacy might be resolved through Mill’s appeal to the principle of maximising utility: if the happiness of the whole set “A , B and C” is unattainable, and where the happiness of A and B would outweigh the unhappiness of C, it is right to act so as to promote the happiness of A and B. It should also be noted firstly that the utilitarian can only decide retrospectively whether an action was right or wrong and that one could never be certain that an alternate action might not have produced more general happiness (and, so, should have been pursued), so the rightness of an action can never be fully known ; and secondly that utilitarianism is deeply counter-intuitive in its exclusive focus on an action’s consequences at the expense of the intention behind it – as these consequences cannot be certainly known in advance, it is simply a matter of luck whether an action is good or bad . Alternatively, one might adopt the “rule utilitarian” standard, whereby society agrees on rules likely to produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number and then sticks to those rules: however, if these rules override the principle of utility, then their advocate is not a strict utilitarian; whereas, if they are subsumed to the principle, the above problem remains. Indeed, it is easy to see how a strict adherence to the principle of utility would result in the most inhuman conduct: as James Rachels points out in his Introduction to Ethical Theory 2, “a thoroughgoing utilitarian could hardly be a loyal friend, for he would have no special concern for friends… She would not be a loving mother, for she would have no special concern for her children. Even d! espite its logical flaws, the question remains: ‘is it always desirable to act so as to promote the general happiness?’ I shall now argue that it is not. Conclusion I have shown that Mill’s proof of utility is unsound; thus one need not necessarily accept his doctrine. Problems with Utilitarianism In order to decide which course of action should be pursued, the utilitarian must weigh up the alternatives and decide which is most likely to produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number ; he must then act so as to produce this greatest happiness. By according greater value to the ‘higher’ pleasures (such as appreciating poetry) in determining how one ought to act, Mill seeks to express the totality of human wants in his ethic – as he writes, “it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied” (Ch. Mill’s attempted proof may be re-formulated in the following way: (1) each person fundamentally desires only their own happiness; therefore, (2) happiness is the sole good; (3) as everybody desires only their own happiness, therefore (4) the general happiness is the sole good to the aggregate of all persons; therefore, (5) we should act only in such a way as to bring about general happiness. html’) W D Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, Second Edition (London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1983) J S Mill, Utilitarianism (Internet: URL= ‘http://www. As Rachels states , utilitarianism might also lead to distributive injustice. not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good”, he asserts; further, as “each person’s happiness is a good to that person”, the “general happiness, therefore, [is] a good to the aggregate of all persons” (Ch.
Common topics in this essay:
Ethical Theory, Thirdly Moore, BH CH, Ch4 Mills, Mills Proof, Utilitarianism Mill, Jeremy Bentham, Ch4 Mill, University Press, principle utility, Ch2 Mills, mills proof, act promote, university press, situation wherein, promote happiness, proof principle utility, moderately happy, own happiness, produce happiness, special concern, act promote happiness, oxford oxford university, oxford university press, modern moral philosophy, |