A Critique of Mill's Proof of the Principle of Utility
             In his work, Utilitarianism, J S Mill asserts that, "happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things being only desirable as means to that end." He goes on to offer a "proof" of the principle of utility (which may be defined as 'the greatest good for the greatest number'), through which he hopes to show that the moral worth of an action consists in its conduciveness or otherwise to the general happiness. In this essay, I will attempt to show that Mill's proof is unsound and that unrestricted utilitarianism is an undesirable moral doctrine at both societal and personal levels.
             At the commencement of his enquiry into "of what sort of proof the principle of utility is susceptible", Mill declares that, "to be incapable of proof by reasoning is common to all first principles, to the first premises of our knowledge, as well as to those of our conduct" (Ch.4). Rather than present a rational argument in favour of utilitarianism, then, Mill asks his reader to reflect upon their inner motives for action and suggests that these are based upon a desire for one's own happiness. "This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good", he asserts; further, as "each person's happiness is a good to that person", the "general happiness, therefore, [is] a good to the aggregate of all persons" (Ch.4). Mill then goes on to demonstrate that all other motivating forces behind human action – the desire for wealth, for power, for fame, or to act virtuously – are particular !
             manifestations of our desire for personal happiness and, thus, are subsumable to it; as he writes, "there is in reality nothing desired except happiness" (Ch.4).
             Mill...