say, I will, with particular reference to Mill's essay, "Utilitarianism", and Benjamin Gibbs' various explanations and clarifications of Mill's theory of higher and lower pleasures, seek to elaborate on the views Mill felt on higher and lower pleasures, both on how to distinguish between them, and on the qualitative value he ascribed to each.
             Higher vs. lower pleasures: what's the difference?
             On what exactly higher faculties constitute, Mill takes the standard, rather intellectually aristocratic view: higher faculties are those that involve and are derived from the exercise of the intellect, moral sympathy, and generally distinct from the lower, "animal appetites" such as the basic needs for food, sex, freedom from pain, etc. Mill does not go into much detail, generally, into any distinction, assuming, it seems, that the difference would be evident to all who read his essay. The distinction is not as clear-cut as Mill would have us believe, I think, for there are many pleasures of a decidedly non-aristocratic bent such as the appreciation of a footy match which, (although Mill might have discarded the prospect as a plebeian, lower pleasure), may involve the higher faculties to some degree: the contemplation of the intricacies in team's overall strategy on the field, or the evaluation of odds when placing bets.
             True – the appeal to the intellect may not be as profound or demanding as an evaluation of Kantian epistemology, if we are to judge by the effort and quality of intellect required, even if we only use raw quantity as a benchmark: as seen in a comparison of the absolute number of people who can effectively evaluate a footy game's strategy to the absolute number of people who can effectively evaluate Kantian epistemology. However, it is perfectly plausible that the lowbrow, man-on-the-street is capable of developing a skill in evaluating, say, a skilful feint in a team&a...