ncerned with looking after the gods. Socrates wonders what Euthyphro means by "looking after the gods." Surely, the gods are omnipotent, and don't need us to look after them or help them in any way. Euthyphro's final suggestion is that holiness is a kind of trading with the gods, where we give them sacrifices and they grant our prayers. Our sacrifices do not help them in any way, but simply gratify them. But, Socrates points out, to say that holiness is gratifying the gods is similar to saying that holiness is what is approved of by the gods, which lands us back in our previous conundrum. Rather than try to find a better definition, Euthyphro leaves in a huff, frustrated by Socrates' questioning
             Analysis and ThemesOverall Analysis and Themes
             If Plato's dialogues in general are notable for their depth within a relatively straightforward framework, the Meno is particularly so. At first glance, the dialogue seems to proceed quite clearly (albeit with a few somewhat involuted sections, such as the geometrical quiz given to Meno's slave). It also seems to settle or establish very little--in the end, no definitive answer is given to the text's central question of what virtue is.
             This simplicity and inconclusiveness, however, hide an extremely ambitious set of goals. The first such project we encounter concerns the nature of a definition, a concept quite new in Socrates' time and largely at odds with the received wisdom of ordinary Greek citizens. That the nature of virtue could even be a question is remarkable to Meno (and presumably to Plato's early readers)--indeed, he opens the dialogue not by asking what virtue is, but rather if and how virtue can be taught.
             Thus, much of the initial dialogue is devoted to the idea that virtue must be rigorously defined before we can deal with subsequent questions about it. This point is at the heart of the Socratic elenchus, which seeks to clear the ground of received, unconsidered knowledg...