Moral Truth in Emotivism and the Social Convention Theory

             Ethical theory aspies to an articulation of the principles and motivations underlying our intuitive moral judgements. A sufficient theory must, therefore, account for the character of morality as we view it. We regard morality as aspiring to truth, and our intuition dictates that our moral judgements are at least sometimes true. We speak of morality as involving some degree of universality within the whole of humanity or within society. Philosopher Gilbert Harman presents emotivism as a potential theory and rejects it as an insufficient account of our sense of moral truth. He presents the social convention theory as a feasible alternative, but his proposal does not satisfy the criteria on which emotivism is rejected.
             Emotivism asserts that moral judgements express emotions, attitudes, feelings, favor, and values. They are expressions of, not about, approval or disapproval. For example, emotivism does not say thatX is wrong? meansI disapprove of X.? The first statement expresses disapproval. The second is about the speaker's disapproval.
             Moral judgements, according to emotivism, are manifestations of emotion rather than expressions of cognitive states like beliefs. Emotivism accounts for the passion of moral responses, explaining moral disagreements as differences in attitude, rather than differences in belief. Moral judgements cannot be explained in assigning characteristics to actions as in the sentence,To hit Sally is wrong because to hit Sally is to cause suffering.? This is of the formX is wrong because X has characteristics C.? Emotivism claims that it is always an open question as to whether or not X is wrong. The descriptive phraseX has characteristics C? lacks the force of emotion. This assertion seems to deny the existence of universal values.
             Despite such evidence to the contrary, emotivism does not eliminate the possibility of universal values. Perhaps some basic values are congenital. The assumption...

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Moral Truth in Emotivism and the Social Convention Theory. (1969, December 31). In MegaEssays.com. Retrieved 03:30, March 29, 2024, from https://www.megaessays.com/viewpaper/84611.html