On Kruschev and DeStalinization
Upon the death of Stalin in March of 1953, ending twenty-five years of psychological and fear tactic domination by the Stalin regime, a collective leadership replaced the totalitarian ruler of the USSR. From that consequent power struggle, Nikita Khrushchev, bolstered by a strong agricultural background and a heroic military reputation for his leadership in the battle at Slalingrad, arose and took the reigns of leadership from 1953 to 1964. This period is characterized by a dramatic series of reforms, at first quite successful, then ultimately strewn with self-contradictory failure, that touched on every aspect of Soviet life. Khrushchev's reform agenda relied on an all-encompassing goal towards "de-Stalinization", geared towards exposing then reversing Stalin's most heinous abuses of power. The program was comprised by a series of societal reforms that started with the liberation of prison camp victims, measures limiting bureaucratic abuses, and broad economic and welfare reforms set to undue the problems of the Five-Year Plan and place Russia on a fast road towards industrial and agricultural competition. The following paper will discuss Khrushchev's successes and ultimate failure during thi
The Virgin Lands policy opened up huge areas of land in the east, north, southeast, and promoted corn as a major grain and fodder crop (Medvedev 58). These agricultural advancements in developing available acreage, corn and wheat crop success, and tractor production placed Khrushchev in great position and the de-Stalinization of agriculture, an initial success. Khrushchev embarked on a plan to increase production of consumer goods and the Soviet food supply in agriculture, which were necessary to right the imbalances of Stalin's twisted Soviet economy, and essential for a rising industrial country, that hoped to reach the levels of Western Europe and the United States. He closed many specialized industrial ministries, and transferred many governmental positions from Moscow to less lucrative positions on regional economic growth councils throughout the USSR. The most totalitarian and draconian laws were lifted as the forced-labor concentration camps were reduced and liberated. His new target figures, set for 1960, were 60 million tons of steel, 500 million tons of coal, and 60 million tons of oil. While bringing leaders closer to the people, a more democratic frame of government, Khrushchev's changes were not well-received by those who'd benefited from certain luxuries that came from the disgustingly wide gap between the living standards of public officials and ordinary citizens, characteristic of the Stalinist milieu (Medvedev 83). From the struggle that included the likes of Molotov, Kagonvich, and Malenkov, it was Khrushchev that emerged victorious (Medvedev 55). The bureaucracy decided that things had gone too far, and that the policies of the present Leader were putting the whole system in danger. Both policies relieved economic problems and boosted the morale of the farming peasantry. Such changes dramatically increased the tension between Khrushchev and the Central Committee Plenum, previously his chief supporter. In lieu of severe postwar devastation, a death-toll of twenty-seven million, the near complete destruction of industry and societal infrastructure, the USSR was able to overcome World War II losses within five years, thanks to the planned use of already available resources, and the die-hard effort exerted by the population (Grant 105). One of his most radical and most harmful decisions occurred when he abolished state-controlled machine-tractor stations and the transfer of their agricultural equipment to the kolkhozes, a previously prudent plan of reorganization, justifiable considering the consolidation of kolkhozes begun in 1950. The eleventh-year secondary school program that called for workers' participation in education, pay-scales to make up for slow labor productivity in the labor reform of 1961, and caps on government-based payment to workers in Siberia, the north, and the Far East caused severe worker unrest (Medvedev 145). The speech at the Twentieth Party Congress immediately established Khrushchev's own "cult of personality" that would have direct relations with the downfall of his various systems later on.
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