t invasion.6 Very few articles devoted solely to the
             Hungarian crisis had ever appeared in Soviet military journals
             (particularly after “normalization” began in Hungary in the late
             1950s), so there was no doubt that the publication of Lashchenko’s
             analysis had been carefully timed. Several months before the article
             went to press, Imre Pozsgay and other top officials in the Hungarian
             Socialist Workers’ Party had publicly declared that the events of
             1956 were a “popular uprising against an oligarchical regime that
             was humiliating the nation.”7 By contrast, Lashchenko still insisted
             that the events of 1956 were merely a “counterrevolutionary
             rebellion that was actively supported by the most reactionary forces
             of international imperialism.” This harsh assessment was clearly
             intended to help prevent the political changes in Hungary from
             endangering the raison d’etre of Soviet military deployments in
             Unease within the Soviet military regarding the 1956 invasion
             ...