nition of justice would capture the proper limits that "shape" this true and stable nature (368e). Why not look for justice in the city, then? He believes that we can focus more easily on the tangible elements of an ideal city than on the intangible makeup of the human soul. Perhaps by identifying the essential "mix" of components necessary for a just society we can move, by analogy, to an understanding of the ideal composition (or "constitution") of a human soul. On this assumption, it is proposed that we " first investigate what justice is in the cities, and afterwards let us look for it in the individual" (369a).
             According to Plato, human society originates in natural conditions. The primary condition is that of individual need. As he states, "a city...comes into being because each of us isn't self-sufficient but is in need of much" (369b). The pursuit of our sustenance, coupled with our natural limitations, leads us to look outside of ourselves, and thus "one man takes on another for one need and another for another need, and, since many things are needed, many men gather in one settlement" (369c). This arrangement is encouraged by the fact that "each of us is naturally not quite like anyone else, but rather differs in his nature; different men are apt for the accomplishment of different jobs" (370b). In this sense--because of the need of all and because of the disparity in individual capabilities--the origin of all cities is natural. The defining quality of the Good City is found in what it does with these natural conditions. For natural objects, "the work of each thing is what it alone can do, or can do more finely than other things" (353a). The virtue of such objects, then, is the product of each doing its own particular work, (for example, the virtue of eyes is sight). Analogously, the virtue of the individual, in the context of the city, requires "that each one must practice one of the functions in the city, that one for wh...