; it is to be expected that people answering different questions will procure different answers. To this end, the heterogeneous affair will be hewn into separate strands; each analysed on its own merits; all with an eye to determining how much, if at all, Germany can be blamed for the advent of war. I shall conclude to the effect that while long-term causes, most notably the rise of Germany as a 'Weltmacht', left Europe destined for war, they should be seen as conditions, not causes. This leaves the shortsighted mobilisation plans (of Russia and Austria) and the actions of the great powers in the July Crisis as the more important, immediate causes of war. Bethmann-Hollweg and Moltke will be singled out as the men who most directly led to war. The evidence will show that Germany cannot be blamed for planning a war as such, but its leaders can be held culpable for their incompetence.
             In short, yes. A culmination of many inveterate factors pointed directly toward armed conflict on a grand scale. The rise of Germany, accompanied by the decline of Austria-Hungary were the surest portents of war. The ascension of the 2nd Reich was nothing less than astonishing, and, for this Bismarck is owed a debt of gratitude. In under half a century, the newly unified country had become the cardinal power in Europe, both in terms of industrial and military strength. This meteoric rise had been accompanied by the pursuit of a 'place in the sun'; Germany's prestige lagged far behind her other endeavours. To this end, Germany pursued 'Weltpolitik', an aggressive form of imperialism. The main policies of Weltpolitik were to build a German Navy strong enough to impose neutrality on the British in any future European war; to make Germany a major imperial power, by way of territorial expansion; to use foreign-policy to unify the country and weaken the appeal of socialism. The last does not bear on 'Sammlungspolitik', the idea that Germany went to war to prevent...