The ways in which nations interact with the world have, arguably
             since the Industrial Revolution and even more so since the beginning of the
             jet age, depended upon their corporations. Globalization, first through
             rapid international physical transit and more recently through instant
             access, at least concerning intellectual property/goods and transactions
             surrounding that intellectual property as well as tangible properties
             shipped and received, is making two things possible, one after the other.
             The first is the inevitable knocking into each other of the old-world
             methods of commerce, and those of the new world: the U.S. notably, of
             course, but also Canada and the NAFTA trading partners, conceivably. The
             second is that "the forces of globalization may be eroding the elements
             that once made European corporations unique. Still, historically speaking,
             and especially when compared with their American counterparts, European
             companies exhibit enough common traits for us to speak of an old-continent
             model'." (Amatori, 1999) Naturally, this makes a coherent antitrust
             policy covering all parties a challenge.
             Historically, the European model has seen the state as a major player
             in the economy; as well, close relations between the banking and industrial
             sectors reinforced this view and the fact of it. (Amatori, 1999) In the
             U.S., historically, there has been reluctance to bring the state in as an
             active player in the nation's economic life, and the relations between
             banking and industrial sectors were anything but close. Indeed, they are
             often adversarial. Likewise, European and U.S. views of who should benefit
             from commercial life differ. Europe puts is emphasis on stakeholders,
             while in the U.S., the emphasis is on shareholders. This has led to the
             prevalent hostile takeover in the U.S., despite antitrust laws, something
             seen less often in Europe. (Amatori, 1999)
             ...