e difficulties in intelligence and military and political aid in the war on terror but unfortunately, "the job of building democracy in Russia is not only incomplete but is becoming more difficult," (p. 2). The reasons for Russia's recent stagnation and trends toward autocracy are complex but include the weaseling of FSB and former KGB officials into both Parliament and the Kremlin. Consequently, the balance of power in the Russian government is skewed in favor of an elite group whose presence is eerily reminiscent of the Soviet Era. For example, President Putin has engaged in overtly undemocratic means of safeguarding the interests of his political party and its special interests such as by providing "constant positive coverage on all of Russia's national television networks" for Parliamentary candidates in his Unified Russia political party (McFaul, p. 6). Because political party development was relatively weak before Putin's being elected president in 1999, and because of recent clampdowns on a free press, any whisper of opposition would have gone unnoticed by the large majority of voters who supported Putin and his comrades throughout the past several years. Political party development remains relatively weak, impeding the organic growth of democracy in the Russian Federation. The result of weak democratic institutions and ideology is, as Solnick puts it, that "the Russian elite has been not so much replaced in the transition [from Communism to Democracy] as reshuffled," (p. 13). Essentially the Kremlin and Parliament are peopled by former FSB leaders including Vladimir Putin himself.
             The 2003 Parliamentary elections drew considerable consternation internationally and revealed significant fissures in the budding democracy in Russia and analysts have assumed an increasingly "fatalistic" tone about Russia's transition to democracy (Solnick). While economists may hail the Russian Federation's potential for growth, political analysts...