gnitive attitude thanks to which the essence of the concept is realized; then, the existence in the circle of properties contained in the concept's essence is affirmed.
             One may legitimately suppose evaluations of moral and esthetic worth to arise in an analogous manner. To wit, a representation of the object evaluated becomes, then and only then, a motive for evaluation, when the person doing the evaluating has assumed a particular evaluating attitude, either moral or esthetic. Those attitudes, well-known to moralists and estheticians, are kindred to attention when that is conceived as a cognitive attitude: like attention, they are characterized by an intensification of focus at the expense of its narrowing. They differ from it however, by the fact that representation with them is a motive for the affirmation of value, and not of existence. For therein lies the very difference between the essence of evaluation and that of perceptional or analytic judgment.
             The evaluations thus arisen are singular, similarly to perceptional or analytic judgments, the subject of which is taken in suppositione formali, i.e., in relation to the concept's abstract object. That is so because their object is either an empirical individual-when the object of evaluation is given in the representation (image); or it is an abstract object of a general concept-as in the case, e.g., when an analysis óf the concept of happiness is taken as basis for evaluating happiness as having positive value. It should at the same time be noted here that there is a difference between singular evaluations as mentioned above, and their generalizations which will be dealt with further.
             Like all judgments, evaluations may be affirmative or negative and true or false. Namely, an evaluation affirming the value of an object is true, and only then, when the object is in fact valuable; an evaluation is false in the opposite case.
             Passing to the next part of our comparison, w...