ctually have higher levels of cultural capital than their superiors because they view the dominant bourgeoisie as "vulgar and lacking in cultural discrimination" (2002: 47). This secondary-level class value culture above financial goals and "seek to legitimate their class position" (ibid.) in doing so. The remaining two class sectors (petit bourgeois and working class) are defined as having mid-level and low-level amounts of capital. Hills tells us that these last two classes are treated as more or less totally homogenous by Bourdieu, meaning that they are all considered to have the same tastes and values in the cultural sphere. This generalisation of two entire class groups is one area in which Hills finds fault with Bourdieu's theories.
             Another major flaw that Hills identifies is concerned with Bourdieu's implication that cultural capital has "a fixed and monolithically legitimate" (2002: 48) status that is not to be debated over nor disputed. Bourdieu implies that race, age, class and sex do not matter where cultural capital is concerned, if you do not 'invest' in the culturally-valued items and artefacts, you have little or no cultural capital. This, combined with Bourdieu's earlier assertion that the working class have negligible amounts of cultural capital, totally neglects the fact that many members of the working class spend a lot of time investing in cultural products that are not deemed worthy of investment by the dominant class groups. However, both Fiske (1992) and Thornton (1995), through their theorising of such ideas as 'popular capital culture' and 'subcultural capital' go some way to
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