onclusion must be drawn that the EU policy over the recent past has been lacking in any real worth in aiding development in the Third World.
             One of the problems of trading relations as exemplified by the Lomé Convention of 1975 is that, despite ostensible being a co-operative arrangement, it is patently clear who the dominant partner is. Inclusion of the safeguard clause, and the EU's perceived willingness to make use of it means there is uncertainty in developing markets, which hinders investment and therefore growth.
             Furthermore, the EU has placed significant limitations on which goods are to be traded freely and which incur tariffs. Those industries which threaten weaker European industries face barriers to trade, however the process of deindustrialisation in the West has meant that these tend to be older primary and secondary industries which are precisely those on which developing countries are likely to concentrate. Tsoukalis rightly points out that free access for industrial exports means very little if there is "little to export" . This could seem to make the gesture of trading preferences seem rather more hollow; nevertheless, the EU remains the most important source of foreign capital for many third world countries .
             Most studies on trade effects of EU policy yield a positive result for developing countries, however the broad consensus is that the benefits are at best marginal and short term in nature; that is to say, the growth of exports in a particular nation has been shown to be determined by that country's export supply conditions (degree of outward orientation in business strategy, bureaucratic constraints, activity of investors etc.). However it has also been shown that in those countries where export conditions were indeed favourable, the existence of beneficial trading agreements contributed to the degree of growth success achieved .
             The complex network of preferences and agreements which has buil...