ian identity. Israelis were also growing tired of their roles as occupiers, as soldiers trained to defend their country in war were finding themselves aiming their weapons at rock throwing teenagers. Many Israelis were disillusioned and desperately eager for a solution. When the United States and Russia initiated talks in Madrid and Washington at the end of the Cold War, it seemed that peace was attainable. But the talks quickly broke down as dogmatic assertions and old accusations were repeated. (Finkelstein, p. 14-15) In June 1992, the Labour government was elected in Israel on a platform of peace and change. At its head was Yitzhak Rabin, former military chief of staff. His move from the battlefield to the negotiation table was a historical moment in the life of Israel. Madrid had failed because Israeli and United States delegates refused to deal with the PLO. But Rabin and foreign minister Peres, unlike their predecessors, were willing to pursue new avenues for peace. The way was now paved for one of the most intriguing diplomatic accords of recent years, the Oslo Agreement. It was now clear that direct dialogue was needed between the PLO and Israel. (Peres, p. 12) Secret talks were arranged between the two sides in Norway starting in January 1993. However, one key matter held up the talks, that being the Israeli ban on contact with the PLO. When the Israeli Knesset repealed this, the way to Oslo was open. Talks took place between January and May of 1993. As talks continued, complications arose, notably Israel's insistence that it retain control of West Bank security. However, as trust grew, both sides compromised as they moved towards reconciliation and mutual recognition. After eight months of negotiations, an agreement of principles was signed secretly in Oslo. The declaration of principles bound Israel and the Palestinians to a five-year interim agreement. Power over Gaza and Jericho would be transferred to the Palestinians...