Bismarck was simply following Prussia's Polish policy, and his ability to lie low in order to prevent any further damage to his position shows his flexibility as a diplomat.
             It also seems unlikely that Bismarck planned in advance to use the Schleswig-Holstein dispute as a pretext for war with Austria. His aim instead was to annex the duchies to Prussia, hence the joint action with Austria in 1864 which reduced the chance of other powers intervening. This aim gradually widened to that of Prussian dominance in north Germany, and Bismarck hoped that, using the Convention of Gastein, Austria would give up north Germany peacefully.
             However, though he would have preferred to make gains peacefully, Bismarck was prepared to go to war with Austria should the need arise. As early as 1856, in a report to the Prussian foreign minister Manteuffel, Bismarck wrote, ``we shall be obliged sooner or later to fight Austria for our existence''. Bismarck's policy always allowed for war, and he merely took this option when Austria broke her agreement with Prussia by taking the dispute to the Confederation Diet and thereby closing the option of a peaceful arrangement. It was therefore Austria that misjudged the aims of Bismarck, and Austria's actions that led him to take advantage of his situation and declare war.
             The traditional view makes the guess that, at a meeting with Napoleon III at Biarritz in
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