s supplied by individuals to a community.
             This is possible because of the assumption that the market function has the same properties as the individual functions.
             The expected utility function can be represented like so:
             An individual that will not engage in any criminal activity will have a utility function where the expected utility will equal the utility of their initial wealth. The individual will only commit the crime if the expected utility exceeds the utility of abiding by the law. The decision of the individual to supply crime is dependent on their attitude to risk in addition to the magnitude of L, G and p. It is important to note that even if the individual is risk averse, the gamble may still be accepted if the levels of p and L are low enough and the payoff from the risk sufficiently high.
             Becker believed that the only means to reduce the amount of crime in order to minimise costs through policies such as the probability of detection and the severity of the sentence. The idea of the social loss function can now be introduced. The imposition of a fine is considered to be a transfer payment thus posing no social cost, however, imprisonment and probation have social costs that are greater than those of the offender as outside resources need to be employed as a means of imposing the punishment. Any action carried out as a result of a crime that is committed imposes costs on society such as the damage from the actual offence as well as the costs of running the legal system as well as the opportunity cost of the punishment. As a result, the design of any crime deterrent policy must take into consideration the costs and benefits of reducing crime (the optimal level of crime is not necessarily zero).
             The aim of a deterrent policy ought to be the minimisation of society's loss function:
             Becker concluded that anybody willing to commit a crime must have a 'risk-loving' attitude because 'crime doesn&...