> Each person experiences a lot in a lifetime, and each experience helps
             >create who the person becomes in the future. Memories of lessons learned,
             >emotional trauma, family experiences, all assist in developing a person.
             >Although everyone changes in time our memories can be said to be the only
             >thing that truly stays with us through our lifetime, even though we may not
             >remember every single detail through out our life.
             >Our physical body changes over time and makes it difficult to identify a
             >person physically after a period of time. The brain is the main central
             >organ in our body that contains our memories, does having the same brain in
             >our physical body identifies us? Memories, contained in our brain, can be
             >forgotten or deteriorate with age and it can be argued that it is also
             >difficult to use memories as a basis for identity. Or does our soul identify
             >a personís identity, but what exactly is a soul?
             >Who am I? How would I attempt to describe my identity? What makes me, me?
             >Pojman summarized Lockeís idea on personhood, The mental characteristics
             >(ability to reflect or introspect) constituted personhood. Personal identity
             >was indicated by the successive memories that the person had, the continuity
             >over time of a set of experiences which were remembered. We can call this
             >the psychological states criterion of personal identity. The main competitor
             >of this view is the brain criterion, though some philosophers hold to a body
             >The memory criterion or the psychological states criterion of personal
             >identity provides that identity is based that our memory stays with us over
             >a lifetime. But what about the aging factor, donít we have a tendency to
             >lose some memories as we age and not remember every detail as we may have
             >yesterday. ìThomas Reid suggests a problem of transitivity in memories.
             >Suppose there is a gallant officer who at age twenty-five is a hero in a
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