laimants might undermine public authorities' duty to promote interests of the community.
             Neither would the courts hold public bodies liable if to do so involves entering into areas of policy which are not properly justiciable. Thus courts will not expand the duty in a way which will interfere with certain quasi-judicial or regulatory functions of statutory bodies.
             Moreover, the courts have generally held that there can be no liability for negligence where the actions or decisions of a public authority fall within the discretion given to the authority by the Parliament (X v. Bedfordshire) where a public authority has a statutory power rather than a statutory duty and fails to exercise that power, it will be even harder to show that it fell outside the ambit of the discretion. According to Lord Hoffmann in Stovin v. Wise, the claimant would have to prove that 'it would in the circumstances been irrational not to have exercised the power, so that there was in fact a public duty to act'.
             However once a body has decided to exercise its discretion in a particular way, it may well owe a duty of care in putting its decision into effect. This is where the normal 'Caparo' principles would apply according to Lord Browne-Wilkinson in X v. Bedfordshire.
             The test of foreseeability and proximity would appear to be the same for public authorities as for other defendants; whether or not it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty will be heavily influenced by the statutory context. The courts have often considered whether the legislation was intended to protect people like the claimant and to prevent the kind of harm which the claimant suffered as in the cases of Peabody Donation Fund v. Sir Lindsay Parkinson and Murphy v. Brentwood District Council. There is also less likely to be a duty of care if other remedies available to the claimant would have provided an adequate an effective alternative to a negligence cl...