The initial groundwork for Berkeley's position is the truism
that the materialist is a skeptic. In the writing of his three
dialogues, Berkeley develops two characters: Hylas (the materialist)
and Philonous (Berkeley himself). Philonous draws upon one central
supposition of the materialist to formulate his argument of skepticism
against him; this idea is that one can never perceive the real essence
of anything. In short, the materialist feels that the information
received through sense experience gives a representative picture of
the outside world (the representative theory of perception), and one
can not penetrate to the true essece of an object. This makes logical
sense, for the only way to perceive this real essence would be to
become the object itself! Although the idea is logical, it does
contain a certain grounding for agnosticism. Let the reader consider
this: if there is no way to actually sense the true material essence
of anything, and all knowledge in empiricism comes from the senses,
then the real material essence can not be perceived and therefore it
can not be posited. This deserves careful consideration, for the
materialist has been self-proclaimed a skeptic! If the believer in
this theory were asked if a mythical beast such as a cyclops existed
he would most certainly say no. As part of his reply he might add that
because it can not be sensed it is not a piece of knowledge. After
being enlightened by the above proposed argument, though, that same
materialist is logically forced to agree that, because the "material
substratum1" itself can not be sensed, its existence can not be
treated as knowledge. The materialist belief has, in effect, become as
futile as proving that the cyclops exists; his ideas have lead him
Having proven that the materialist is, at best, a doubter,
Berkeley goes on to offer the...