s from the same HMO receives a fixed amount, say $F, no matter the service administered. This is formally referred to as capitation(Goldstein, 221.). This in turn creates an incentive for the physician to hurry his/her care to the patient in order to maximize his/her revenue. In this type of model, where a physician wants to maximize revenue, we are assuming that a physician is willing to give inadequate care or hurried care in order to maximize revenue. In order to understand the theory of a lowered expected salary we must hold many variables constant, one of which is the quality of care given. Ceterus paribus, treating a fixed amount of patients with a fixed quality of care!
             , a physician can expect to earn much more in a fee-for-service model than a capitation model offered by current HMO's(Goldstein, 152.). In this case it is clear that reform in health care can lead to a salary decrease for physicians. The flat rate paid to physicians by HMO's have been empirically determined to be far less than a fee-for-service paid to the physician by a patient(Miller, 301.). The ability to lower the price of fee-for-service to a price of managed care is possible only through the HMO's exertion of market power on suppliers (physicians). In an unconstrained world, physicians should be able to logically determine that remaining independent, and charging a fee-for-service is more profitable. But through this exertion of market power, HMOs are able to obtain groups of physicians willing to work for them. This market power is established because patients, by choic
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