(the JCPC or the Board). As Mallory has pointed out, in some respects the JCPC might have constituted an ideal court of constitutional appeal. [Note 2: See the discussion of the role of the JCPC in J.R. Mallory, The Structure of Canadian Government, 2d ed. (Toronto: Gage, 1984) at 377-81.] Made up of British judges who were members of the House of Lords, the JCPC was clearly impartial and disinterested as between the federal and provincial governments in Canada. The Board was also well positioned to defend the liberty of individuals and the rule of law; law lords sitting in distant Whitehall were far removed from the short-term political pressures that might overwhelm the good intentions of a local tribunal.
             Despite these potential advantages, the record of the Privy Council in its interpretation of the Canadian constitution is, at best, a mixed and highly controversial one. The JCPC took a document whose clear intention was to create a centralized federation and interpreted it as allocating many of the most important areas of legislative jurisdiction to the provinces. Furthermore, the scheme of federalism created by the JCPC turned out in many respects to be unworkable. The twentieth century witnessed a dramatic expansion in the role of government, with the state assuming responsibilities in social and economic policy that would have been unheard of in 1867. Yet most of these new responsibilities were regarded by the Privy Council as matters for the exclusive jurisdiction of the provinces, who lacked the necessary financial resources to deal effectively with these new challenges. One of the largest challenges facing both levels of government in Canada since 1945 has been to d!
             evise mechanisms that will permit them to escape or to bypass the unworkable and impractical constitutional framework created by the JCPC.
             This chapter begins with an overview of the manner in which the JCPC interpreted the division of legislative ...