n attempt to address the main issues that arise in regulating trade based on 'privileged', non-public information, in the light of the Fairness vs. Efficiency debate. In doing so, we are going to distinguish between different forms of insider trading, emphasising on corporate insider trading and selective disclosure, and to present the need to address these forms by the law separately. We are then going to analyse and evaluate the various arguments, for and against, the need for regulation, its appropriateness, and how it may affect the workings in the financial markets. Finally, we will attempt to present alternative measures to establish and preserve a workable balance between market fairness and efficiency.
             The subject of this part will be an examination of insider trading from the corporate insider point of view, namely the managers of the corporations. As it is mentioned above, insider trading involves transactions in financial securities by persons having access to "privileged"-secret, confidential- information not yet available to the general investing public, and who in consequence stand to profit from exploiting this knowledge. For example, managers are said to have 'unequal access' of information and so are forbidden to trade based on that information. In order to examine corporate insider trading, we are first going to consider some general arguments regarding inside trading, analyse some theoretical issues arising from insider trading which mainly involve the provision of property rights and their optimal distribution, and the view of 'insider' profits as an efficient compensation device to rectify the agency problem. Additionally, we are going to examine the advantages !
             and disadvantages arising from the implementation of this practice.
             2.1 GENERAL ISSUES ON CORPORATE INSIDER TRADING
             There is a fundamental difference between the legal and economic definitions of insider trading. I...