fect from the time of his taking supreme command, until D Day. Eisenhower and his subordinates prepared and planned the impending invasion using Allied intelligence that was instrumental in pinpointing German strengths and weaknesses along the Normandy coastline, primarily being the Atlantic Wall and the German divisions that fortified the most colossal defensive formation ever constructed up to that point in time. In addition, it was increasingly evident that the air supremacy the Allies enjoyed would dictate the direction Operation Overlord would lean towards to exploit German weaknesses and allow the ground troops any chance whatsoever to break th!
             rough the formidable Atlantic Wall. Although the Allies certainly held an advantage in the air, the size of the forces landing along the Normandy coast and the benefit of a surprise attack, the fact that the Germans were well fortified and entrenched assisted in balancing the tables between the Allies and Germany.
             Being able to immobilize German troops, supplies and rations was crucial in Eisenhower's eyes. Attempting to isolate the troops along the Atlantic Wall, Eisenhower and Air Marshall Tedder were the strongest advocates of the Transportation Plan which called for the Allied air force commanders to knock out lines of communication, bridges, railroads in the weeks preceding D Day. A major stumbling block Eisenhower and his staff faced was to convince Churchill of the effectiveness of the Transportation Plan without numerous civilian casualties inside France. It is certainly evident that Eisenhower felt that the Transportation Plan had to be implemented at almost any cost. This was a potential disaster that was averted by endorsement from the representative of the French Committee of National Liberation and finally, Roosevelt's wholehearted stamp of approval. It was at this point that Churchill succumbed and the Transportation Plan was a reality.
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