, 1974). In the Camp David Accor!
             ds, it was clear that there had not been equality in power between Israel and Egypt: the Egyptian army had been defeated, and its economy was crippled; the Israeli army, meanwhile, had been newly equipped, and Israel could count on US backing (Coalition Analysis, Howard Raiffa, 1982). However, power is also a matter of perceptions: after 1973, both Israel and Egypt felt strong and victorious, and both were supported by superpowers. Only because of this feeling of strength were they ready to embark on negotiations. This example led to a discussion about the question as to whether the Palestinians, in 1993, felt that they had won the war, the Intifada, and consequently engaged in negotiations, it seemed that although they had won the war, they were still in a very weak position due to the serious problems inside the PLO following the Gulf War, the strength of the Hamas, and the dominance of Jordan. They had, however, achieved some success inasmuch as their negotiators were ackno!
             wledged as Palestinians, while the Palestinian problem was once again on the global agenda. It was also mentioned that Israel had a strong interest in coming to the negotiation table: it was wager to gain Arab recognition and to reach peace settlements with its neighbors. It can be concluded that in order to come to the negotiation table, an interest in a negotiated settlement, unlike equality, is a basic necessity: reality shows that negotiations often take place between the victor and the vanquished and that outcomes are often imposed (Dr. Abdul Hadni, 1998). The opposite side of the coin is that the weaker side is not powerless; it also has assets to bring into the negotiations. In the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, it is amazing how much the Palestinians, a group without the support of a functioning bureaucracy, have managed to get out of Israel; just as remarkable is the extent to which they have succeeded in filling...