In Book I and II of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes some assumptions about the character of the human soul, dividing it into a part that governs (reason), a part that is or ought to be governed by reason and a part that is normally unresponsive to reason. Thus, in his argument he is referring to virtue and virtuous issues. Some virtues will have reason as their subject while others will have the passions-qua-governed-by-reason as their subject. The differences among virtues will mirror the differences among the various passions and among the various functions of reason. In Aristotle's eyes, Virtues are habits of the soul by which one acts well, i.e., for the sake of what is fine and noble. As Aristotle puts it, virtuous actions express correct (right) reason. They are acquired through practice and habituation. One becomes virtuous by acting virtuously or good, i.e., by acting as the virtuous person acts, doing what one should when one should and in the way one should. And the virtuous person comes to take pleasure in acting virtuously. Hence, one sign that we have not acquired a certain virtue is that when we perform actions of the sort associated with that virtue, we do not take pleasure in those actions but instead find them burdensome. By the same token, one becomes vicious by allowing certain defective ways of acting to become habitual. Virtue is difficult to attain, since if we simply follow our inclinations, we become vicious. Hence, even though we have a natural desire for happiness, our inborn inclinations often lead us away from our true happiness.
             In the Meno, Socrates and his interlocutors discuss the nature and teachability of virtue. They reach two different conclusions: in the first part, that virtue is knowledge and can therefore be taught; in the second, that it is reliable true opinion and can therefore be acquired only by divine inspiration. By taking into account Socrates' role as a teach...