falsificationist philosophy he claimed he had escaped the problem. The problem of induction simply put is that one cannot infer infallibly from a particular to a universal and that you cannot use a particular to justify a universal claim.
             P1 Particular instance "X is Y"
             T1 Universal claim, "All Xs are Y"
             This would appear to be an invalid inference for one could think of many instances where it was untrue. From observing one monkey dieing at five years old one cannot infer indubitably that all monkeys will die at five year olds. To prove it one would have to test all "Xs" in every possible scenario and there is no way of knowing that the claim will not encounter conditions which were not anticipated before conception, and could not have been anticipated. It is possible though that the claim could be tested if it had a small amount of constituents, such as "Asian lions are less than 6 foot tall." Considering there is only a few hundred, this claim could conceivably be tested. Popper did not think that science works by inductive inference, he asked (1) "Can we take the experienced instances for granted? And are they really prior to theories?" Rather he argues that scientists work by making bold conjectures and then by other scientists refuting or falsifying them, and that this, unlike the inductive method, is a justifiable way of practicing science. His argument simply put is the inference between a particular and a universal claim is infallible when the particular instance is falsifying the universal claim.
             T1 Universal claim, "All Xs are Y"
             P2 Particular instance "This X is not Y"
             A bold claim or conjecture such as "all spherical objects float in water" can be falsified easily by observing just one spherical object not floating in water. C2 is a valid conclusion if and only if P2 is true and upon an analysis of the concepts employed in formulating T1 one does not find a contradictio...