t of a pro-Slav Minister who would might try to achieve a "Kaunitz" coaltion of France, Austria and Russia based on the paradoxical pillars of Pan-Slavism and French Clericalism. Simultaneously his economic protectionist policy against Russian imports as well as his agreement with Austria to abandon the Schleswig plebiscite caused vocal anti-German propaganda in Russia. The Dual Alliance was hence signed with Austria as a specific defensive alliance against Russia the day before Andrassy left office (7th October 1879), only to be replaced by the anti-Russian Haymerle.
             Of course, Bismarck wanted a Three Emperors Alliance all along and realised he would have to secure Austria first so he may have invented the insecurities deliberately. He was, however, afraid of being trapped with only the Dual Alliance and no link with Russia who might subsequently turn to France ensuring that Germany would be in a weaker position than even Austria. Even if Russia did not secure a French alliance Germany's geographical position would leave her as the battlefield in an Austro-Russian conflict. Germany was subsequently very keen to secure the Three Emperors Alliance of June 1881. Yet even after this centre piece of his system was secure, it was fear aroused by General Skobelev's speech in Paris (17/2/82) and the tsar's failure to respond which made Bismarck insecure about Russia once more and seek further security in the Triple Alliance of May 1882. Therefore German (and specifically Bismarckian) fear can be seen as a significant characteristic in the construction of the first alliance system.
             With fear and insecurity, however, did not come a lack of control and a second characteristic of the system is that it was forged entirely by Bismarck and Germany. Not even Russia and Austria were interested in an alliance with each other, both had other preferences. Bismarck wanted a system which could prevent Austro-Russian conflict in the Balkans by tying t...