ut if so, it is surprising that we have not heard more about them from Milosevic's propagandists. The Kossovars deserve at least one chance to build a free society, and it was within NATOs power to help them achieve that goal.
             Moreover if you recall the air strikes versus ground troops debate that was going on at that time. If air alone had been successful in 1995 in convincing milosovic to withdraw his support for the Bosnia-Serbs then air power again, many, argued, could be used to persuade him to leave kossovo. However, this strategy might have been ineffective because the entire region was already exhausted by war in 1995. The 1995 military offensive by the Bosnian-Croat coalition may also have been the real driving force behind Serbia's decision to negotiate the Dayton settlement. Air strikes alone would certainly not compel the Serb-nationalists to surrender Kosovo. Moreover, bombing from the air contributed to, if not created, the ground conditions entirely conductive for ethnic cleansing to occur – precisely the situation NATO claimed it was seeking to avoid.
             As for the war in Kossovo, it is clear that NATO could only win it by sending in ground forces. The NATO powers got into the present mess because in 1995 they bombed the Serbs in Bosnia to force them to negotiate, and it worked. They obviously thought the same tactic would work again. However, in 1995 the air raids were accompanied by a Croat offensive on the ground, which made a difference. Beating the Serbs on the ground is not a hopeless task. They may have a good army, and they may have the advantage of mountainous terrain, but they are not invincible. In 1995 the Croats routed them with an army raised and trained from scratch in only four years, even though Bosnia is just as mountainous as Kossovo.
             "The reply to those who argue that bombing was the only strategy that could ensure Alliance cohesion is that, by ruling out the ground option, NATO go...