ng immersed in the religious language-game. On this view, prayers do not 'ask' a 'personal' being to do anything, nor does theology claim that God is the 'cause' of the world, in senses of these words having any connection with their normal senses. The point of prayer, for example, is simply for the person praying to align his attitude to the world with that of the correct moral stance. It has seemed to most religious believers that this represents a total reinterpretation of religious discourse, rather than an account of it as traditionally practised and believed. Some Wittgensteinian fideists have acknowledged that they are reinterpreting religious language, claiming that the language-game so interpreted is worth playing, whereas interpreted in the traditional way it amounts to unjustified superstition.
             That brings us to the central question whether there is good reason to believe that there exists a God as traditionally belie
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