hanced by a public myth of uniqueness. British policy towards its continent could be qualified as a "splendid isolation" (quoting the words of Lord Salisbury). Britain dominated over a quarter of the earth's surface and over as many people. The British Empire had no need for allies. But diminishing advance and aggressive colonialism made isolation dangerous, resulting in Britain's agreements with France, Japan and Russia in the early 1900's. British domination became questionable.
             In the premises of the Second World War (1939), even though the Foreign Office of that time remained sceptical, J. Monnet and Sir A. Salter were entrusted with drafting an "indissoluble" economical and political union. This cooperation was narrowed down to only France and Britain. However, this commitment towards Europe quickly dropped with the war when Pétain came into power in France in 1940 and Churchill believed an alliance with the United States was essential. After the fall of France, Britain and its empire stood alone. National identity and pride were strengthened; no disaster of the Nation-State as in Italy or Germany was to occur. The globalisation of this crisis emphasised the importance of extra European links. Britain, being the weakest of the 'big three', had to maintain good relations with the emerging 'superpowers', and consolidate wartime unity with Commonwealth countries. Great Britain had lost their supremacy and not yet found a role in the new world order.
             One of the first reasons for creating a European Community was the fear of war and invasion. Europe did not want another World War and France and Germany quickly agreed that the only way of avoiding a new conflict was to create strong links between European countries. Britain, after the war, was in a completely different situation. She had not suffered the same damages as the rest of the continent. Her economy remained st...