he next fifteen years no country other than the major declared nuclear powers [Russia and China] will develop a ballistic missile that could threaten the !
             contiguous forty-eight states" (Cooper).
             Advocates also argue that a NMD would help protect the United States from an accidental launch from Russia, former republics of Russia, and China. According to the Central Intelligence Agency, "Russia employs an extensive array of technical and procedural safeguards and China keeps its missiles unfueled and without warheads mated" (Mendelsohn 30). Even if there were some type of accidental launch from, it would be hard to determine the number of missiles that would be launched. Any significant amount would overwhelm a NMD and it therefore be rendered useless. Also, "Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have transferred to Russia all the strategic and tactical nuclear warheads they inherited following the collapse of the Soviet Union" (Ray 324). These weapons are now under the safeguards utilized by the Russian government and therefore are protected against an unauthorized launch.
             Nuclear weapons have been used as a deterrent from their inception. Backers of the NMD allege that rogue states that acquire ICBMs while also possessing nuclear capabilities could use this for "coercive purposes" (Krepon 31). This is true; however, would this coercion really be effective against the United States? As discussed by Graig and George, there are three conditions which must be met for a successful coercive diplomacy policy: "the coercing power must create in the opponent's mind a sense of urgency for compliance... a belief that the coercing power is more highly motivated to achieve its stated demand... and a fear of unacceptable escalation if the demand is not met" (197). The first two of these conditions might easily be met by a rogue state, but a rogue state would have trouble meeting th...