e no problems arise from the fact someday a zygote may be perceived to be viable in so much that viability can still be used as a criterion for personhood, then that criterion may also be used in the abortion argument. Zaitchik states that he will argue, "that no obvious problems, perhaps no problems whatsoever, follow from the mere fact that someday even a fertilized ovum may be viable." He demonstrates that no problems occur by constructing other arguments using the future medical technological progress objection as a basis.
             Before Zaitchik can refute the claim of problems arising from the future medical technologies, and before I can determine whether he successfully accomplishes this task, the working definition of viability must be derived. The criterion for viability I see Zaitchik working from is one where a viable fetus is one that could be saved through artificial means given the technology available in principle to someone, somewhere in the world. I believe he defines it in the following passage,
             "So when we say that a viable fetus is one which could be saved through artificial means, given the current state of available medical technology we do not mean medical technology actually available to the particular fetus in question, we mean medical technology in principle available, perhaps only somewhere else in the world and only to the wealthy."
             By stating the definition in this manner, it is explicitly stated that not every fetus will be able to receive the medical technology available to it, either for economic or geographic reasons. If the technology s so expensive that only a small percentage of the extremely wealthy may have access to it, that shouldn't, and by this definition doesn't, make a fetus who is excluded from the technology any less viable that from one who is privileged enough to have access to it. Similarly, if the technology is available in a place very distant from a particular fetus, so th...