was that they could not bring itself to
view the VCI as the most important enemy. But as the US military troop buildup
progressed in the early 1960s, more and more resources went toward battling the Viet
Cong, and then to the North Vietnamese Army. Before the Phoenix Program was
installed, the Central Intelligence Agency, or CIA, had Provincial Reconnaissance Units,
or PRU, which was a separate program which was a means of passing rice, medicine, and
other building supplies into South Vietnamese's rural countryside. Unfortunately, many
of those supplies ended up on the black market, or worse, in the hands of the Viet Cong.
So as the war continued on, North Vietnam was winning the war and weakening US
forces because of the their negligence of the Viet Cong.
Army planners recognized the existence of both the political infrastructure of the
Viet Cong and the main-force units of North Vietnam, but they were unable to
distinguish which was more significant. General Westmoreland's answer to this
dilemma was that he, like the rest of the army, had been trained to believe that war would
always be conventional. But when the situation in Vietnam did not conform to this
concept of conventional warfare, they had troubling dealing with Vietnam's warfare
tactics, which its effectiveness was clearly shown. The American military insisted the
war was basically conventional and could be won by conventional means. They chose to
disregard many of the lessons learned by those, mainly the French, who preceded them in
The CIA finally realized the value of seeking out and destroying the enemy
infrastructure, even if the military did not. Along with the United States Overseas
Mission, or USOM, the CIA began recruiting province special units, who were trained in
techniques of rooting out and eliminating the enemy infrastructure. The CIA appeared to
have the right idea about going after t...