people aware of a public issue.
             One final point to make is that companies cannot use harassment directed at them as a criminal offence.
             This can be shown in the case of DPP V. Dziurzynski [2002] EWHC 1380 .
             The DPP appealed against the dismissal of a charge that D, an animal rights protester, had pursued a course of conduct which amounted to the harassment of the employees of B contrary to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s.2 (1). The appeal was dismissed as Parliament had not intended to make harassment directed at a limited company a criminal offence, as shown in the wording of the statute - 'him' and 'victim' used in s.4 (1).
             Janet has been threatened with a civil injunction preventing her from using the public footpath for the purpose of spying on, annoying and disturbing.
             If Janet persisted to use the footpath for this purpose, then Dump-It could ask the court for an injunction. If she ignored this, then Janet would be in contempt of court and so liable to a fine, or even imprisonment.
             A public footpath can be used by anyone, but only for passing along it in the course of a bona fide journey – if Janet was using it for 'spying' as Dump-It claim, this would be a improper usage, so trespass would occur.
             This very traditional view was shown in the case of Hickman V. Maisey [1900] 1 QB 752. The defendant who owned a racing newspaper spent two hours walking up and down the highway, taking notes on a racehorse in a field next to the path. The claimant who owned the land where the horse was trained (and of which the highway crossed) argued trespass had been committed. This decision was held as the defendant was not using the path for a bona fide journey.
             Despite this, there are certain laws that protect the public right of way, such as s. 130 of the Highways Act 1980. Subsection 1 of this states that:
             'It is the duty of the highway authority to assert and protec...